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The theory of evolution has transformed biology from a largely descriptive science
to a causal one. However, few psychologists have a thorough understanding of
evolution. As a result, psychologists tend not to consider evolutionary explana-
tions for the phenomena they investigate, or they present flawed evolutionary
arguments that violate fundamental principles of evolutionary theory. The pri-
mary objective of this article is to outline the basic principles of evolution as they
relate to the study of behaviour in general. The article then goes on to demon-
strate the application of evolutionary theory to the study of human behaviour in
particular, and concludes with a discussion of problems that can occur when evo-
lutionary theory is applied incorrectly.
An Introduction to Evolution
When Darwin published On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection in
1859 he dramatically changed the nature of biological inquiry. In Origin he put for-
ward an idea of such elegance, such tremendous explanatory power, that it has sur-
vived almost 140 years of close scrutiny, vigorous debate and empirical investigation.
Evolution by natural selection has become the foundation upon which modern biol-
ogy rests. As Dobzhansky (1973, p. 125) put it, ‘nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution’. Prior to the publication of Darwin’s influential
work, biology had been a primarily descriptive discipline dealing with questions of
immediate function and proximate causation. With the rise of evolution, however,
biologists began to ask new kinds of questions (Mayr, 1982; Young, 1992). Instead of
simply asking what the function of a particular trait was, biologists began to ask how
it came to be that way, and why it took its present form rather than some possible
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alternative. Evolutionary thinking highlighted the importance of historical context,
and probed questions of ultimate causation (Mayr, 1982; Young, 1992). The biolo-
gist’s repertoire of ‘what’ questions was joined by an array of ‘how’ and ‘why’ ques-
tions, which shed light on biological phenomena ranging from molecular structures
within the cell to complex behaviours of individuals and groups.
The theory of evolution by natural selection, as proposed by Darwin, was based on
three principles that could be readily observed in the natural world: variation, hered-
ity and selection. The first of these principles, variation, states that individuals within
a population vary in the degree to which they possess certain morphological, physio-
logical or behavioural traits. The second principle, that of heredity, remained a mys-
tery during Darwin’s lifetime. Nevertheless, it was clear even then that individuals
were more likely to resemble their parents than unrelated members of the population
in the possession of these varied traits. The final principle of selection came from
recognition that not all individuals within a natural population survive with equal
probability, nor reproduce in equal numbers. Individuals are in competition for essen-
tial resources, such as food or shelter (Darwin, 1859). External pressures, such as pre-
dation or climactic conditions, can also lead to the demise of certain individuals over
others. Evolution by natural selection occurs when individuals survive and reproduce
differentially by virtue of these inherited traits, with those variations better suited to
the prevalent conditions achieving disproportionate representation in the next gener-
ation. Over substantial periods of time, traits become better adapted to their specific
function through repeated cycles of reproduction and selection (Darwin, 1859).
The principles of variation, heredity and selection remain central to the theory of
evolution, but our understanding of the processes of evolution has seen several addi-
tions and refinements. The first of these refinements came once more from Darwin
(1871), who noted that the competition for mates within a population creates its own
selective pressure. This form of selection, known as sexual selection, occurs when some
individuals obtain higher levels of reproductive success — at the expense of others —
due to heritable traits that influence mating success. Darwin recognised two ways in
which sexual selection could act upon these traits within a population to produce a par-
ticular adaptation. First, traits may be selected for directly by members of the opposite
sex, leading to greater reproductive opportunity for those bearing the trait in abundance
(Darwin, 1871). A well-known example of this kind of sexual selection is the splendid
tail of peacocks, which are displayed by males to attract females (Petrie, Hall, Halliday,
Budgey, & Pierpoint, 1992; Petrie, Halliday, & Sanders, 1991). The second form of
sexual selection occurs when a trait allows individuals of the same sex to compete
directly for mating opportunities (Darwin, 1871). For example, the antlers or horns of
deer are often used in competitions between males over access to females (see
Andersson, 1994). Darwin saw sexual selection as being distinct from other forms of
natural selection in that fitness is not determined by external environmental factors.
Rather, an individual’s fitness depends on how it compares with other members of the
population who are also in possession of a particular trait (Darwin, 1871).
The next major addition to evolutionary theory came with the advance of
Mendelian genetics shortly after the turn of the century, which unlocked the
black box of heredity (Mayr, 1991; Young, 1992). An understanding of the mech-
anism by which gene complexes encoding the developmental program for specific
traits could be passed from generation to generation prompted rigorous mathe-
matical investigation of variation and the effects of selection. Fisher (1930)
showed that gene frequencies within a population could be altered by selective
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pressures, thus leading to disproportionate representation of the traits coded for by
these genes. This work, and the similar arguments of Haldane (1932) and Wright
(1931), paved the way for the ‘modern synthesis’ of genetics and natural selection
in the 1960s (see Mayr, 1991; Ridley, 1993; Young, 1992). By providing an explana-
tion for genetic variation and its maintenance within populations, which represents
the raw material upon which natural selection acts, the modern synthesis placed the
theory of evolution on sound foundations. In addition, the incorporation of genetics
into evolutionary theory led to a novel approach to the study of behaviour.
Evolution and the Study of Animal Behaviour
Prior to the modern synthesis, the study of evolution had dealt mainly with the
structure and function of physical attributes. This began to change with the devel-
opment of kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1964), which
gave tremendous insight into the evolution of social behaviour. Hamilton and
Maynard Smith both noted that close relatives share a significant proportion of
their genome. For example, a parent shares approximately 50% of his or her genes
with each offspring. Similarly, full siblings share about 50% of their genes. This led
to the concept of inclusive fitness, whereby the reproductive success of an individ-
ual — the number of copies of its genome passed on to the next generation —
includes offspring of immediate relatives by virtue of their shared genes (Hamilton,
1964). Hence, an individual may never reproduce and still have a high inclusive fit-
ness if its siblings have many offspring. This principle is likely to influence a great
deal of social behaviour seen in animals. One prediction of kin selection theory is
that individuals should be more likely to behave altruistically towards close relatives
than towards distantly related or unrelated members of the population (Hamilton,
1964; Maynard Smith, 1964). An altruistic individual may give a warning when it
detects an approaching predator, allowing those nearby to escape to safety at the
risk of attracting the attention of the predator to itself. Such behaviour makes evo-
lutionary sense if the sacrifice made by the altruist benefits close relatives who are
themselves likely to carry the gene complex responsible for altruism (Maynard
Smith, 1964). Relatedness thus enables an altruistic trait to be passed on to future
generations in spite of the demise of individual altruists. As such, kin selection
favours behaviour that enhances the survival and reproduction of close relatives.
The modern synthesis also saw the use of game theory to model evolutionary
scenarios (Hamilton, 1967; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). Game theory had pre-
viously been used to model economic situations where many agents were in compe-
tition, each following a strategy that was partially dependent on the actions of the
other agents (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Likewise, the application of
game theory to evolution allows the use of theoretical models to explore situations
in which more than one strategy is available to an individual, and where the choice
of strategy will vary depending on the strategies currently being used by other mem-
bers of the population (Maynard Smith, 1982). For example, many male frogs and
crickets attract females by calling. An alternative strategy is for a silent satellite
male to sit close to a calling male so as not to run the risk of attracting predators to
itself, and then intercept females as they approach the call (see Andersson, 1994).
However, the satellite strategy is only effective if there are sufficient numbers of
calling males in the area. If too few males call in one location, females will not be
attracted and the satellite strategy becomes ineffective. Hence, the viability of one
strategy is dependent on the relative frequency of the alternative strategies in the
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population. Game theory is most useful when a range of behavioural strategies are
open to an individual and the choice of which strategy to use is made in the context
of the strategies chosen by others. Game theory thus provides a way to predict likely
evolutionary consequences in competitive situations and the relative proportions of
various strategies within a population (Maynard Smith, 1982).
Since its inception, the theory of evolution has come to play a central role in
the study of biology. Evolutionary thinking has in some way affected every facet of
biology. In some cases this involves experiments designed to directly measure the
effect of natural selection on physical traits or population structure (e.g., Reznick,
Shaw, Rodd, & Shaw, 1997; Losos, Warheit, & Schoener, 1997; Losos, Jackman,
Larson, de Queiroz, & Rodriguez-Scettino, 1998). Similarly, a wealth of studies
have been carried out to investigate the role of kin selection in the behaviour of
social insects (see Crozier & Pamilo, 1996), and the role of sexual selection in the
evolution of structures and behaviours used by animals in the competition to attract
mates (see Andersson, 1994). However, even studies that are not explicitly designed
to test some aspect of evolutionary theory are carried out in the context of an evolu-
tionary history of life. Purely structural or functional questions are still a pertinent
and important part of biology, but these questions are now asked from within the
framework of evolutionary theory (Mayr, 1982; Ridley, 1993; Young, 1992).
Evolution has truly become a metatheory of biology.
Evolution and the Study of Human Behaviour:
Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology is simply psychology that is informed by the additional knowl-
edge that evolutionary biology has to offer, in the expectation that understanding the pro-
cess that designed the human mind will advance the discovery of its architecture (Barkow,
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992, p. 3).
In many ways, evolutionary psychology is not a field per se. Instead, it is a ‘way of think-
ing’ about all psychological phenomena. As is the case with biology, the ultimate pur-
pose of an evolutionary approach to understanding human behaviour is to determine
causality. Evolutionary psychologists pursue this purpose by proposing the existence of
psychological mechanisms that underlie a range of human behaviours. A psychological
mechanism need not correspond directly to a specific structure in the brain; rather, it is
a theoretical construct used to describe a specific aspect of brain function that may be
morphological, physiological, endocrinological or some emergent phenomenon repre-
senting a combination of these. In the absence of a corresponding physical structure,
the existence of a psychological mechanism needs to be inferred indirectly from the
range of behavioural or physiological responses to a specific class of input (see Buss,
1995). The endeavour to relate particular aspects of behaviour to the evolutionary his-
tory of known brain structures is likely to play an increasingly important role in the
future of evolutionary psychology (Panksepp & Panksepp, 2001). 
Evolution is the causal process by which complex physiological systems come
about. Therefore, in defining what is a psychological mechanism, one must accept
that the brain (i.e., its anatomy and physiology) is what makes human behaviour
possible. Psychological mechanisms can then be understood as the interface
between the brain and behaviour. However, as evidenced by behaviour genetics, the
anatomy and physiology of the brain are not sufficient to totally account for
observed behaviour — behaviour is also influenced and shaped by one’s environ-
ment (see Hetherington, Reiss, & Plomin, 1994; Plomin & McClearn, 1993).
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Genes, therefore, do not encode specific behaviours but rather predispositions toward
particular types of behaviour. In this light, it can be seen that individual acts, or
specific instances of a given behaviour, are not themselves the direct product of
evolution because they always take place in an environmental and developmental
context. Instead, evolutionary psychology posits that the evolution of heritable
behavioural predispositions takes place at the level of psychological mechanisms.
The brain has a long evolutionary history, and as such many fundamental mecha-
nisms driving behaviour are likely to be homologous to those found in other mam-
mals (see Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp & Panksepp, 2001). However, a substantial
number of psychological mechanisms are thought to have evolved in response to
specific cognitive problems faced by ancestral humans in the environment of evolu-
tionary adaptedness.1 Given their uniquely human nature, it is these mechanisms
that are most likely to attract the scrutiny of evolutionary psychologists. 
Uses and Abuses of Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary theory can provide a useful framework for the study of mechanisms that
underlie many aspects of human behaviour. There are several areas, however, where
care must be taken to avoid some common conceptual errors when applying evolu-
tionary theory to psychological investigations. For example, when carrying out
research within an evolutionary paradigm there is always the temptation to lapse
into adaptationist storytelling, whereby a plausible explanation for an evolved trait is
presented as a fait accompli, without any attempt to provide empirical evidence.
These explanations have been labelled ‘just so stories’ after the stories by Kipling
(1902), such as ‘How the leopard got his spots’. One example of this practice is an
argument for the adaptive value of humour and laughter (Weisfeld, 1993). Weisfeld
points to evidence that humour has an evolved basis, such as the early onset of
laughter during development and its independence of culture, and proposes a plausi-
ble adaptive function for humour in which laughter acts as a form of social reward
(Weisfeld, 1993). Weisfeld’s argument is well considered and internally consistent,
but until it is subject to empirical testing it remains an evolutionary just so story.
There is nothing wrong with postulating evolutionary scenarios for the origin of par-
ticular traits, as noted by Buss (1995), provided this marks the beginning of a study
into the trait in question. The problem occurs when these hypotheses are given
undue weight and considered ends in themselves.
In order to test such evolutionary hypotheses in the animal kingdom, biologists
often compare the survival and reproductive rates of individuals bearing and lacking
the trait. This provides an estimate of the relative fitness of the various individuals,
indicating the selective advantages or disadvantages associated with the possession of
the trait. However, the application of this technique to human behaviour strikes
another conceptual problem. As pointed out by Symons (1989, 1990, 1992), there is
an important distinction to be made between adaptive behaviour, by which repro-
ductive fitness is maximised, and an adaptation. Lauder (1996, p. 61) provides a
useful definition that clarifies matters: ‘an adaptation is a trait that enhances fitness
and that arose historically as a result of natural selection for its current biological
role’. The principles laid out by Darwin (1859) state that the trait must also be
hereditary. When dealing with animal behaviour, these criteria are routinely met.
Behavioural adaptations, such as startle behaviour in crayfish or courtship behaviour
in frogs and insects (Young, 1989), show clear heredity, and are subject to selective
pressures from the environment and from other members of the population.
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However, with the exception of simple, stereotypical behaviours such as smiling,
laughing or walking, these criteria are seldom met in the realm of human behaviour.
Human behaviour is considerably more complex and flexible than the behaviour
of any other member of the animal kingdom. Nevertheless, research in the field of
behaviour genetics has suggested that much of human behaviour has a heritable
component (see Plomin & McClearn, 1993). In considering complex behaviours,
the focus of the search for adaptation must be at a deeper level: the mechanisms
underlying behaviour rather than individual instances of behaviour. By way of anal-
ogy, suntanned parents do not give birth to suntanned infants. They do, however,
have children with the heritable ability to vary the level of melanin produced by
their skin in response to environmental stimuli. It is the underlying mechanism of
differential pigmentation that is inherited, and so it is at this level that we say the
ability to tan is an adaptation to environmental variation in levels of sunlight.
Similarly, when studying human behaviour we must seek the level at which an adap-
tation can be identified. The adaptation must show heredity, and must bear rele-
vance to the ancestral environment of evolutionary adaptedness.
For example, Palmer (1992) suggested that rape of females by males is an adapta-
tion that is distinct from the spectrum of human copulatory strategies. Rather than
focusing on the possible selective advantage bestowed upon a rapist, Palmer’s argu-
ment deals with the victim and her mate (presuming that she has one). He suggested
that the distinct category of rape is used by males when deciding whether or not to
abandon their partner after a copulation with another male (Palmer, 1992).
However, this argument provides no insight into the supposed origin of rape as an
adaptation. Even if there is a selective advantage to be gained by males who choose
not to withdraw parental effort after the rape of their partner, such behaviour on the
part of the male is in no way connected to the behaviour of the rapist. For rape to be
an adaptation favoured by natural selection it must be a heritable behavioural trait
passed from generation to generation by virtue of the selective advantage it provides.
Clearly this is not the case. Rape is almost certainly not a mating strategy passed
genetically from father to son, and so cannot be considered an adaptation, regardless
of any effect it may have on reproductive fitness. In seeking an evolutionary explana-
tion for rape, we would be better served to look for the mechanism underlying coer-
cive sex as part of the spectrum of human sexual interactions (e.g., Lalumiere,
Chalmers, Quinsey, & Seto, 1996). Just as the mechanism underlying the ability to
tan results in a range of phenotypes under different environmental conditions, the
mechanism that underlies rape is likely to have a range of possible behavioural con-
sequences that will be influenced by the environment and upbringing of individuals
bearing the trait. This mechanism, should it be elucidated, could represent an adap-
tation; rape as a fitness-maximising behaviour cannot.
The search for an evolutionary explanation for rape highlights another problem-
atic aspect of evolutionary psychology known as the naturalist fallacy (see Pinker,
1997). This is the notion that because a class of behaviour represents an evolved
trait it must somehow be considered good or right. The naturalist fallacy has the
potential to excuse, or even endorse, behaviours ranging from schoolyard bullying to
genocide. For example, social Darwinists of the late 19th century, such as Herbert
Spencer and William Graham Sumner, used evolutionary arguments to support
eugenics (Caudill, 1998). However, such arguments are built upon a fundamental
misconception. It is not possible to derive a moral stance from what is essentially an
amoral process. Evolutionary theory can shed light on the history of certain patterns
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of behaviour, allowing us to better understand the underlying mechanisms and their
origins, but when it comes to deciding the moral or ethical value of these behaviours
evolution can offer no guidance. In addition to the naturalist fallacy, the study of
evolved psychological mechanisms, like the study of behaviour genetics, raises the
question of genetic determinism. The argument, for example, that some people are
natural born killers who are unable to exert conscious control over their genetic pro-
gramming belies the tremendously complex interactions between genetics and envi-
ronment during development. Evolution does not diminish personal responsibility any
more than it can provide absolution for acts judged by society to be reprehensible.
Conclusion
Evolution is a theory of great explanatory power that has totally revolutionised modern
biology. In more recent years, psychologists have recognised that the theory of evolu-
tion also has utility for the study of human behaviour. However, care must be taken
when making evolutionary arguments regarding the origin of psychological phenomena.
A poor grasp of evolutionary theory can lead to an inappropriate justification of antiso-
cial behaviour on the grounds that it may once have served an adaptive purpose.
Similarly, some behaviours may be labelled as adaptations, neglecting both the funda-
mental role of heredity required for true adaptation in the evolutionary sense, and also
the vital interplay between genetic predispositions and the developmental environment
that together shape our behaviour. The study of the evolution of human nature can pro-
vide valuable insight into the mechanisms that drive many kinds of behaviour provided
caveats such as those discussed here are held firmly in mind.
Endnote
1 See Tooby and Cosmides (1990) for more on the environment of evolutionary adaptedness.
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